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POLISH ANXIETIES, SOVIET APPREHENSIONS 
The authors of this article are Dr. Richard Sharpless 
(Socialist) , professor of history, Dr. Stephen Lammers 
(Roman Catholic) , professor of religion, both at Lafayette 
College, Easton, PA, and Dr. Paul Mojzes (United Methodist) , 
professor of religious studies at Rosemont College, Rosemont, 
PA. They wrote this article after attending the Ninth 
Christian-Marxist Peace Symposium in Madrid, Spain, in 
October 1981. 
A Russian who attended a symposium recently held in Madrid told a 
Polish story: "The Lord decided to take a look at what was going on down on 
earth. First, He took His telescope and zeroed in on the United States. He 
saw that the people were working very hard, that they were arming 
furiously, and that they were very frightened. God then decided to see what 
the Soviets were doing. He focused His telescope on the Soviet Union and 
saw that the peop 1 e were working very hard, and that they were arming 
furiously, . and that they too were very frightened. Now thoroughly a 1 armed, 
God decided, nevertheless, to get a third opinion. This time He took a look 
at Poland. At first He couldn't believe His eyes, so He looked more 
closely. Sure enough, He saw that the Poles weren't working, they didn't 
care at all about arming themselves, and they weren't afraid of anybody. 
Much relieved, God said to Himself, "At least my children in Poland still 
trust in Me!" 
The story, told with more exasperation than humor, described something 
of the atmosphere at the Ninth International Christian-Marxist Symposium 
held in the Spanish capital October 21-26, 1981. While the American, 
European and Soviet participants expressed their viewpoints and traded 
charges and counter-charges over who was most responsi b 1 e for the 1 atest 
arms buildup, the Poles made a rather anguished and eloquent effort to get 
themselves understood, and to stay out of the line of fire. 
In formal sessions of the Symposium, designed to bring Christians and 
Marxists together in di a 1 ogue on issues of peace and disarmament, and in 
intense private discussions, the Poles gave ample testimony that they 
weren't interested in armaments--at least Polish armaments--that they were 
indeed trying to work things out, and that they were very worried, despite 
appearances to the contrary. As a result of the Symposi urn, the American 
participants came away with distinctive impressions on how the Poles, and 
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the Soviets, view themselves, their relations with each other, and their 
perceptions of the Reagan administration. 
Polish Concerns 
It is extremely difficult, even for· those who live in Poland, to 
describe with accuracy what is happening there at. a given moment. The 
situation is fluid and dynamic, with events unfolding rapidly. Those close 
to the Communist Party, the Church and So 1 i dari ty agree that the country 
cou 1 d go in any of several directions. They be 1 i eve that there is great 
danger because no one institution, much less leadership group, really is in 
control of what is going on, especially at the regional and local levels. 
The situation even was described as being "revolutionary", in the sense 
that the smallest incident could spark a major outbreak. 
The food queues, for example, have the potential for causing violent 
incidents that could spread quickly to other areas. The people are j it.tery 
and. apprehensive, and the growing scarcity of food is a cause for major 
concern. This is especially true for those with children. For the older 
generation, accustomed to doing without meat, the problem is not as acute; 
but there is a pervasive fear of what effects the lack of adequate food 
might have on the young. 
The. greatest concern, however, is not over random, 1 oca l i zed 
outbreaks. The major danger is from violence directed against Communist 
Party members. This simply would not be tolerated by the Soviet Union and 
would provoke intervention. The Soviets feel a tremendous sense of 
responsibility for defending their allies. Afghanistan serves as an example 
in this regard. It also might be remembered that attacks on the Communist 
apparatus provided the pretext for t�e intervention in Hungary. In general, 
the Poles feel that the Soviet Union until now has exercised a good deal of 
restraint from mixing in Polish affairs, except verbally to urge caution 
and ·moderation. 
Many Poles believe that the Reagan administration aggravates their 
situation. They claim that there are elements in the U.S. government, not 
only limited to the intelligence agencies, who would welcome Soviet 
intervention because it could be used as an excuse for U.S. aggression 
elsewhere, or as a further j ustification for increased military spending. 
Like other Europeans, both in the East and the West, the Po 1 es are 
alarmed by Reagan's sabre rattling and negative attitude towards detente. 
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While they hold both superpowers responsible for the nuclear arms race, 
they fault the U. S. for the present buildup. They believe that a new arms 
race, into which Poland may be drawn, not only will limit their own 
possibilities for economic development--the only way out of their present 
crisis- -but that the end of detente will circumscribe their freedom of 
action within the Soviet bloc. They agree with the Hungarian Marxist 
phi 1 osopher, Jozsef Lukacs, who be 1 i eves that only detente guarantees the 
Eastern European countries maximum freedom to develop in ways best for 
their own interests. 
The Poles argued that the social upheavals of 1970, 1 976 and 1980 
would have been impossible without detente. The lessening of tension 
between the superpowers in that decade resulted in internal relaxation in 
Eastern Europe, but especially in Poland, that allowed for the expression 
of di ssati sfacti on without immediate punishment from the Soviet Union. A 
new era of superpower confrontation and/or U. S. meddling in Poland's 
affairs would damage the continued trend towards liberalization. Instead of 
proving more space for democratization, it would give the Soviet Union 
justification for mixing in Polish affairs. The Soviets already believe 
that the U. S. is attempting to use Poland to further destabilize the Warsaw 
Pact countries. 
An ex amp 1 e of misguided U. S. po 1 icy cited by the Po 1 es was that to­
wards illegal emigrants. Many Poles travel to the U. S. (and Western Europe) 
on tourist visas, but find jobs and remain permanently. They leave for 
economic reasons, rather than political, and violate U. S. law by working. 
Yet U. S. authorities appear· to tolerate this. The Poles noted that this 
causes a considerable morale problem at home, in addition to the negative 
effects upon the work force. They wondered aloud if this was not a part of 
U. S. "interventionism" to keep Poland stirred-up. 
In discussions regarding internal developments, the Poles insisted 
that, while Poland was not "free", neither was it a totalitarian state. The 
major preoccupation was that the democratization process continue unhi nd­
ered from outside, and .that Poles be left alone to solve their own 
prob 1 ems. One of them stated in a session: "We a 1 one are responsi b 1 e for 
what happened, and we must be allowed to find our own solutions!" 
Three institutions, of course, figure in any "solutions". They are the 
Communist Party (Polish United Workers' Party) ,  the Solidarity trade union 
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movement, and the Roman Catholic Church. Poland, it seems, cannot be 
governed without some consensus among them. Unfortunately, they all are 
divided over methods and goals. 
The Communist Party is split into several factions, ranging from 
hardliners to moderates and progressives. The leadership, however, appears 
willing to admit that serious errors have been made, and that something 
must be done to broaden the base of power. This means creating a mechanism 
that will allow for some sharing of power without necessarily relinquishing 
the Party's central role. The major problem, at the moment, is that there 
is no agreement over how this is to be achieved. 
At least two alternatives are under discussion. One would retain the 
present party structures, but a 1 1  ow for greater sharing of power through 
such means as broader representation and i nterna 1 democracy. Under this 
scheme there would be no new political parties. Another alternative i� the 
creation of a sort of Christian Democratic party, which in Poland would be 
primarily a Roman Catholic party. Once formed, it would bid, not for sole 
power, but for participation in government. The impression is that a 
coalition government of some sort shows greater promise than even an 
attempt of Solidarity to take power. It was remarked that there is an 
element in Solidarity that simply wants to replace the Communists and rule 
as they did. But it was felt that this wouldn't solve anything because 
monolithic control, simply of a different brand, would be continued. It 
almost certainly would provo�e Soviet intervention, while a coalition or 
popular front government probably would be acceptable. 
Part of the interest in a coalition government comes from the percep­
tion that the Church has been one of the most responsible institutions in 
the present crisis. One of the Poles interviewed insisted that the Church 
was the single element of stabilit y  and the chief guarantor of social 
order. There was some concern, however, that the Church recently has been 
leaning too far towards Solidarity. Hope was expressed that the new Primate 
·of the Church would maintain the careful balance of his predecessor and 
continue the Church as a moderating force. 
Any attempt to form a Christian Democratic party is complicated by 
divisions within Catholic political groups that go back, in some cases, to 
before World War I I. The Pax group? almost pro-Facist in their orientation 
before the war, emerged in its wake as an eager supporter of the Soviet 
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Union, the most left-wing Roman Catholic organization in Pol and, and the 
group which most eagerly sought to have its views coincide with those of 
the government. Because of that, their relationships with the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy were practically nil, and their popularity slim. The 
Christian Social Association formed when it broke away from Pax in order to 
provide some independence. A third group, Znak (Sign), also existed as the 
most independent and vigorous Catholic organization. 
Events since 1980 have resulted in significant shifts of positions for 
these organizations. The strongly independent Znak group split, with one 
facti on renaming itself the Social Democrats. Much preoccupied with the 
. continued existence of the Polish state, it· assumes a fairly cautious 
stance. It has five representatives in the Sejm (parliament) . The old Znak 
group, which is strongly pro-Solidarity, is left without any formal 
representation, but with strong moral impact. 
The Pax organization made a dramatic turn-about and formal1y follows 
the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. It now tends to be 
explicitly pro-Solidarity. The Christian Social Association, is now most 
identified with the present government. This group wants to proceed very 
cautiously, and for the time being s�pports the existing political 
structures. 
Solidarity, like the Communist Party and the Church, also has diver­
gent tendencies, as many commentators have noted. It is very de-centralized 
and, in many respects, the leadership in Gdansk is not in control of the 
regional organizations, a fact amply demonstrated by the recent wave of 
strikes. The re-election of Walesa to the leadership of Solidarity was 
aided in large measure by the workers in heavy industries who insisted on 
the continuation of present policies. But this does not imply that the 
national leadership is secure. 
Solidarity, above all, was described as a movement against rather than 
for something. In this respect it resembles the vast populist movements, 
especially of Latin America, that have managed from time to time to appeal 
across class lines by mobilizing the feelings of resentment, material 
frustrations and powerlessness of constituencies as different as intellec­
tuals, middle sectors and workers. It achieved leadership over nine million 
Poles, and created the largest organization in Polish history apart from 
the Church, by mobilizing against the bureaucratic form of communism 
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responsible for the errors that led to the present crisis. It is believed 
that what provides Solidarity with its present unity is its oppositionist 
stance, and that if the organization achieves some measure of power it will 
begin to factionalize along traditional political lines. 
This does not mean, however, that Solidarity is a movement against 
socialism. Though there are elements within the movement opposed to social­
ism, and many others in favor of some form of pluralistic democratic 
socialism, it would be a misreading of Polish events to assume that what 
most of Solidarity's members want is to turn the socio-economic system into 
some form of liberal capitalism. 
Poland's internal divisions also show up in generational differences. 
The older generation, those who lived through World War II and know the 
political realities of the previous era, are terribly aware of the polit­
ical and geographical place of Poland in central Europe, namely that it is 
surrounded by countries that be 1 ong to the Warsaw Pact. They understand 
that Poland is an immediate neighbor of the Soviet Union, which needs it 
for its own defense purposes. Additionally, they are concerned with the 
rapidity of social change in Poland, and would like to see some moderation 
of present trends. 
The younger generation, those drawn to Solidarity, see things quite 
differently. In a sense, they are asking the older generation to step 
aside. They see a chance to remodel Poland just as.the older generation did 
30 years ago. They are not nearly as concerned about the Soviet Union. The 
younger generation believes that relationships like that can best be 
resolved by a vigorous unity among Solidarity's people. 
A poignant ex amp 1 e of generation a 1 conflict was reported by a Po 1 ish 
journalist, a veteran of many political campaigns. Like many Polish fami­
lies, his own was deeply divided by developments since 1980. In an .effort 
to reach an understanding with his son, and perhaps convince him of the 
danger of his ways, he discussed So 1 i dari ty and other issues through the 
whole of a long and tortured night. Finally, his impatient and exasperated 
son shouted: "Listen, you made your revo 1 uti on! Don't try and stop me from 
making mine!" 
Can anything bring the Poles together? Like most victims of history, 
they have a vivid collective memory. What unites most, if not all, Poles is 
the idea that they need a strong state. Their country has fallen prey to 
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partitions before, and they fear anything that weakens the Polish state 
itself, regardless of political hue. It is this fear that may eventually 
unite them again. 
Soviet Anxieties 
While the Poles were preoccupied with their internal situation, the 
Soviet delegation at the Symposium focused almost entirely on the impli­
cations of the Reagan administration's arms buildup. The Soviets, in the 
formal sessions and in private conversations, conveyed a convincing im­
pression that they were genuinely concerned over the possibility of a new 
arms race and a nuclear showdown. Their anxieties and fears of the 
consequences, both internal and external, were quite evident. In some 
respects, they viewed the arms buildup of the Americans as not only a 
danger to peace, but as economic warfare against themselves. 
The Soviets argued that the cost of gaining strategic "parity" in 
nuclear arms, finally achieved a decade ago, was very high for their soci­
ety. The tremendous economic cost of catching up with the United States was 
paid for by sacrifices in the standard of living. Now they have achieved 
parity, and the living standard of the Soviet peoples has been rising; but 
a new arms race, which they feel they would be compelled to enter, would be 
difficult for their citizens and their allies to accept. They expressed 
concern over the psychological impact on morale, for example. 
The Soviets left no doubt, however, that they would make every effort 
to keep up, regardless of the consequences. They obviously believe that if 
they lose strategic parity the U.S. will attempt to "force them to their 
knees" by trying to bring about a co 1 1  apse of their system. They left the 
clear impression that if the U.S. begins to pull ahead in a new arms race 
they will be compelled to "take other measures" to prevent this. 
One of the real fears of the Soviet Union, also expressed by the 
western Europeans at the Symposium, is the Reagan proposal to add Pershing 
and cruise missiles to the theater nuc 1 ear forces in Europe. They regard 
these as first-strike weapons, in no way a counter-balance to the SS20 
miss i 1  es stationed in the western Soviet Union. The neutron bomb also is 
regarded as an offensive weapon, and the Soviets stated that the placing of 
such weapons in western Europe would compel them to manufacture similar 
bombs. Like most of the Europeans at the Symposium, they do not regard the 
neutron bomb as an anti-tank weapon, which the Americans claim it is, but 
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as an offensive device designed to kill off populations while leavins 
production facilities intact. 
In responding to charges that they had conducted their own arms build­
up in the past decade, the Soviets argued that their vast land frontiers, 
surrounded by hostile countries (e.g. China) made this necessary. The Uni­
ted States, surrounded by water and weak neighbors, doesn't require large 
standing armies. In this respect, it makes no sense to compare such weapons 
as the number of tanks. Interestingly,· the Soviet concept of what. 
constitutes a threat to their home 1 and is expanding. The U.S. buildup in 
the Indian Ocean, for example, is regarded as a provocation on their 
southern frontier. 
With respect to Afghani stan, the Soviets made the standard argument 
that they were helping, though reluctantly, a socialist country that had 
called upon them for assistance. They insisted that their stay there was 
temporary. They explained their position as supporting progressives who 
were attempting to overcome a feudal society by providing such things as 
modern education, health care, social YJelfare, ·and promoting equality 
between the sexes. They called the opponents ·of the Afghanistan government 
"bandits", supported by the U.S., Pakistan and China, who were mostly 
interested in destabilizing the area and preventing the consolidation of a 
socialist regime. What upset the Soviets were the atrocities of the 
guerrillas, whom they accused of murdering physicians and school teachers, 
and such things as the b 1 owing up of hospi ta 1 s and schoo 1 s. Though they 
didn't discuss their own methods, and fai 1 ed to understand that their 
reasons for intervention were similar to those used by British colonialists 
in another era, the Soviets left the impression that Afghanistan was a 
nagging and difficult problem for them. 
Convinced that the Reagan administration seeks military superiority, 
the Soviets strongly doubt that the U.S. government is interested in ser­
ious negotiations on arms reductions. They fear that the U.S. will simply 
use negotiations to buy time while ii continues to arm. Nevertheless, the 
Soviets emphasized that they want meaningful negotiations, that they hoped 
for them, and that they continued to trust in their efficacy. On numerous 
occasions they repeated Brezhnev' s statement that a nuclear war would be 
"suicidal". 
What impressed the Americans at the Symposium who had previous exper-
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i ence of di alogue wi th the Sov i ets was not the log i c  of the i r  arguments, 
whi ch had been heard before, but of the thi nly di sgui sed anxi ety that 
underlay them. They obvi ously are very concerned over the i mpact of another 
arms race upon thei r own soci ety, some faults and weaknesses of whi ch they 
admi tted reluctantly . The Sov i et economy i s  beset by seri ous problems that 
obvi ously cannot be solved by ·addi ti onal mi li tary spendi ng. Add i ti onall y, 
there are Poland and Afghani stan, and the costs of ai di ng a bankrupt 
economy and sustai n i ng a drawn-out guerri lla war whi ch, as one Sovi et 
delegate put i t, 11 i s  no pi ece of cake 11 • 
The N i nth Internati onal Chri sti an-Marxi st Symposi um ended i n  a somber 
mood. A Spani sh people deeply di vi ded over the i ssue of enter i ng NATO , a 
fear-r i dden Europe erupt i ng i n  massive peace demonstrati ons, and a growi ng 
current of anti -Ameri cani sm i s  what the U . S .  delegates left behi nd. 
POST SCR I PT 
The art i c 1 e was comp 1 eted and about to be pub 1 i shed When mart i a 1 1 aw was 
i mposed i n  Pol and, at least temporari ly dashi ng the hopes for further . 
li berali zati on and democrati zati on i n  Poland . As the arti cle reflects both 
the hopes and fears of many Poles i t  was deci ded to publi sh i t  as a record 
of the dynami cs of the si tuati on j ust pri or to the drasti c mi li tary 
i nterventi on. 
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